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I. INTRODUCTION
C onsider six professions: kickboxing instructor, judge, restaurant
server,3 manicurist, medical assistant,4 and teacher.' People in each
of these professions are HIV-positive. Which, if any, of the six may an
employer lawfully fire because of HIV-positive status?
Existing interpretations of employment discrimination law produce
answers that are inconsistent and counterintuitive. One group of federal
circuits has held that any risk of transmission of the HIV virus presents a
direct threat because the result, no matter how remote its occurrence, is
death.' Under this approach, all the above employees could be fired,
because each employee presents a remote risk of transmission and because
'MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY OF
THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 194 (1982).
2 See, e.g., Montalvo v. Radcliffe, 167 F.3d 873 (4th Cir. 1999).
3 See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Prevo's Family Mkt.,
Inc., 135 F.3d 1089 (6th Cir. 1998).
4 See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
5 See, e.g., Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701
(1988).
6 See Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d at 1266 (citing that regardless of the precaution-
ary tactics, some measure of risk will always exist because of the activities of
surgery).
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the impact of transmission is severe should it occur.7 A second group of
federal circuits has held that an employee cannot present a direct threat to
others unless there has been a documented case of transmission by an
employee in that profession. 8 Under this approach, the kickboxing
instructor, manicurist, and (until recently) medical assistant would be
protected from discharge because there are no documented cases of
transmission from employees in these professions.9 Yet, the results defy
common sense because contact with a kickboxing instructor or manicurist
is much more intimate and physical than contact with a judge or professor.
Inconsistency in applying employment discrimination law to HIV-
positive employees results from the failure of Congress to provide direction
on how to evaluate the risks that disabled individuals pose to others in the
workplace. Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA") to prevent discrimination against individuals with disabilities."
The direct threat provision of the ADA, denying protections to disabled
individuals who present a direct threat to the health or safety of others in
the workplace, was intended to strike a balance between the interest of
employers and the rights of the disabled."
The current standard defines "direct threat" as a "significant risk to the
health or safety of others" in the workplace. 2 Essentially, the provision
places decisions regarding the safety of interacting with HIV-positive
individuals in the hands of the judiciary, which, in turn, relies on
administrative agencies, the medical community, and, unfortunately, the
public perception of HIV and AIDS.' 3 Since perception of risk is largely
subjective, whether a risk is "significant" is less a factual question than a
social construct.14 Thus, whether ADA protections extend to HIV-positive
7Id.
8 See Chalk, 840 F.2d at 701. The Supreme Court recognized the legitimate
concern of risk of transmission and that this risk could justify exclusion if it could
not be eliminated through reasonable accommodation. The court said exclusion
could not, however, be justified solely on the basis of irrational fear of transmis-
sion. Id.
9 Id.
'o See Matthew E. Turowski, AIDS in the Workplace: Perceptions, Prejudices
and Policy Solutions, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 139, 144 (1993).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2002).
'2 Id. § 12111(3).
13 See Ann Hubbard, Understanding andimplementing the ADA 's Direct Threat
Defense, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1279, 1281 (2001) ("Too often... judges' personal
perceptions of acceptable risks and medical probabilities stand in for the rigorous
scrutiny demanded by the ADA.").
" See Barry Sullivan, When the Environment is Other People: An Essay on
Science, Culture, and the Authoritative Allocation of Values, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 597, 601 (1994).
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individuals depends, in part, on the myths and fears of the judiciary in
regard to HIV. Congress passed the ADA to prevent employers and others
from discriminating against the disabled based on myths and fears. Yet, the
current standard allows the judiciary to use those same myths and fears to
exclude some disabled individuals from the protections Congress intended
them to have.
This Article argues that the determination of whether an individual is
a direct threat to the health and safety of others should adhere to
congressional intent and that whether a risk is significant must be based on
objective scientific knowledge-free from the subjective perceptions of the
public and the judiciary. Section II of this Article provides a backdrop for
discussing how the risk of HIV should be evaluated, including a review of
the pathology and epidemiology of HIV, the statutory framework for
analyzing contagions under the ADA, and the case law interpreting the
direct threat provision. Section III illustrates the conflict among the circuits
regarding the application of the direct threat provision to individuals with
HIV. Section IV analyzes and compares differing approaches to risk and
whether those approaches, as well as the circuit cases, comport with
congressional mandates. Section V proposes a new standard for making
direct threat determinations, focusing on the probability that a risk will, in
fact, materialize, rather than on perceptions about specific disabilities.
Section VI concludes this Article.
II. BACKGROUND
The ADA's direct threat provision requires an examination of three
issues. First, the pathology and epidemiology of HIV and AIDS are
discussed. Second, the effect of direct threat determinations on individuals
and on society is analyzed. Third, statutes defining the rights of employers
and employees are set forth.
A. HIV: The Disease and its Transmission
HIV, the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, is the virus that develops
into AIDS, or Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome.15 The two most
relevant aspects of the disease in terms of employment discrimination are
its effects on the individual and the risk of transmission of the virus to
others. The effects on the individual determine whether a person is an
" CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIV and Its Transmission
(last updated Dec. 24, 2002), at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/facts/transmission-
.htm.
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individual with a disability, a precondition for protection under the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.16 The
risks to others in the workplace, through transmission, is relevant to
examining whether an individual is a direct threat, and therefore, not
"otherwise qualified" under the Acts. 7
1. HIV and its Effect on the Individual
HIV develops in three phases: the seroconversion, asymptomatic, and
symptomatic phases.'" The first phase, seroconversion, occurs when the
body begins to develop antibodies to the HIV virus.' 9 It generally lasts three
weeks and begins from six days to six weeks after transmission.2" This
phase presents itself through "mononucleosis-like" symptoms including
muscle pain, rash, lethargy, fever, headache, neurological disorders, and
enlargement of the lymph glands.2' The second phase, the asymptomatic
phase, lasting from seven to eleven years, presents enlarged lymph nodes
and often skin disorders, blisters in the oral area, and bacterial infections.22
The third phase, symptomatic HIV, marks the point where a person is
regarded in medical terms as having AIDS .23 There are two criteria used for
marking the beginning of this phase.24 The first occurs when a person's
CD4+ cell count is less than fourteen percent of the total number of
16 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (defining
impairment). See also Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)
(discussing the applicability of the ADA to contagious diseases).
" See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-96 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining a Qualified
Individual with a disability); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)
(examining whether HIV is an impairment and whether it is a direct threat under
the ADA).
"8 See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 598 n.8 (citing Helena Brett-Smith & Gerald
H. Friedland, Transmission and Treatment, in AIDS LAW TODAY: A NEW GUIDE
FOR THE PUBLIC 21-23, 3138 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993); also citing Kenneth
G. Castro et al., 1993 Revised Classification System for HIV Infection and
Expanded Surveillance Case Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents and Adults,
41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., No. RR-17 1 (Dec. 18, 1992)).
9 Id. (citing that the HIV antibody is now susceptible to detection).
20 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 635 (citing among others P.T. Cohen & Paul
Volberding, Clinical Spectrum ofHIVDisease, in AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE § 4.1-7
(3d ed. 1999)).
21 See id.
SId. (citing Cohen & Volberding, supra note 20, §§ 4.1-4, 4.1-8).
23 Id. at 636. See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 598 n.8.
24 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 598 n.8.
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lymphocytes, or white blood cells.25 The second occurs when a person is
diagnosed with one or more AIDS-defining diseases.26 For example, the
two primary AIDS-defining diseases arepneumocystis carninii pneumonia
and Karposi's sarcoma, a rare form of cancer." AIDS progressively
destroys the immune system resulting in death from the inability to fight an
illness.2"
In addition to the physical effects on the HIV-positive individual, the
disease has a pronounced social and emotional effects. These effects of
HIV and AIDS play an equally important role in the status of HIV-positive
individuals in the workplace and the discrimination that can occur there.29
The most significant emotional effect on HIV-positive individuals is
depression associated with impending mortality and the social stigma of
AIDS.3" Depression itself may be considered a disability.3 The stigma of
HIV and AIDS results, in part, from the fear of transmission.32
2. Transmission of HIV
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") have "clearly
identified" four modes of transmission of HIV.33 First, HIV can be spread
through "sexual contact with an infected person. 34 Second, HIV can be
23 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 636 (citing Castro et al., supra note 18) (recogniz-
ing that another measure is when the CD4+ count drops below 200 cells).
26 See Garry G. Mathiason & Steven B. Berlin, AIDS in the Healthcare,
Business, and Governmental Workplace, 780 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 633, 637 (1993).
27 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 598 n.8 (giving a brief, yet comprehensive,
description of the progression of HIV).
28 See Mathiason & Berlin, supra note 26, at 637.
29Id. at 642-48.
30 See ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 46 (3d ed. 2001).
31 See, e.g., Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(denying the defendant's request for summary judgment because there was an
issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff's depression was a disability under the
ADA).
32 See Rebecca Trapp, Note, Medical Examination or Objective Medical
Evidence: What is the Correct Procedure to Determine if an Employee Infected
with the HIV Virus Presents a Direct Threat Under theAmericans with Disabilities
Act-EEOC v. Prevo's Family Market, Inc., 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1585, 1585
(1999).
33 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIV and Its Transmis-
sion, at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/facts/transmission.htm. (last updated Dec. 24,
2002).
34 id.
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spread by sharing intravenous needles with an infected person.35 Third, it
can be ,spread from mother to child during birth or after birth, by
breastfeeding, when the mother is HIV-positive.36 Fourth, and less
commonly, HIV can be transmitted through blood transfusions in which the
donor was HIV-positive. 37 Although HIV can be transmitted by blood-to-
blood contact, in most situations this is unlikely because HIV is a fragile
virus; when the blood dries, the possibility of transmission is "essentially
zero."
38
The CDC has also examined the modes of transmission based on
environment.39 In most work environments, the risk of transmission is low
or non-existent, with the exception of the healthcare worker.4" Since there
are no documented cases of HIV transmission through sweat, tears, saliva,
or skin-to-skin contact, casual associations between co-workers seemingly
present only a negligible risk to others.4 Even with more intimate,
nonsexual contacts, transmission is very rare.42 As of 1999, there was only
one documented case of transmission from healthcare worker to patient.43
Despite consensus of the medical community about the low risk of HIV
transmission through casual contact, 44 employers continue to rely on the
direct threat exception to the ADA to justify discriminating against
individuals with HIV and AIDS.
B. The Competing Interests of Employers and Others
HIV and AIDS are prevalent in the workplace.45 Currently it is
estimated that there are 800,000 to 900,000 Americans infected with the
351d.
36 id.
371 d. (occurring rarely now in countries where blood is screened for HIV).
38id.
39 See id. The possibility of environmental transmission is remote. Id.
'0 Id. (involving IV transmission from one infected dentist to six patients).
411d.
42 Id. (citing the fact that casual contact through social kissing presents no risk
of transmission).
43 id.
44 See Turowski, supra note 10, at 142.
41 See Scope of the AIDS Problem, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (MB) §
170.02 (2002) (citing 12 AIDS Policy in the Law (BNA), No. 19 at 6 (Oct. 17,
1997)). Recent studies show that one of every six employers with more than 750
employees has at least one HIV-positive employee and that one in fifteen
employers with 15-49 employees had at least one HIV-positive employee. Id.
2002-20031
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HIV virus.46 An additional 40,000 individuals become infected with HIV
each year.47 Over ninety percent of those infected with HIV in the United
States are part of the American workforce.48 Thus, how employers are
required to treat HIV-infected workers will have a significant impact on
those individuals, their co-workers, clients, and the employers themselves.
The consequences of how direct threats and risks are to be evaluated
extend beyond weighing the interest of the employee in employment and
the interest of the employer in protecting against transmission. The
interpretation ofthe direct threat provision of the ADA has broad economic
and social ramifications for the individuals involved and for society.
One ramification is the cost to employers who are forced to hire and
retain HIV-positive employees. First, the employer incurs costs associated
with the effect of the disease on HIV-positive individuals. Such costs
include higher premiums for health, workers' compensation, long-term
disability, and life insurance.49 In addition, symptomatic individuals present
costs to the employer through frequent absenteeism." Also included are the
costs of accommodating HIV-positive individuals in the performance of
their jobs as required by the ADA, as well as the time and expense of
evaluating the risk posed by them. 2
A second cost is the one the employer faces associated with the HIV-
positive individual's interaction with others in the workplace. Such costs
include reduced productivity due to co-worker fears,53 workers'
compensation claims by co-workers experiencing stress related to working
with HIV-positive individuals, 54 and tort claims of co-workers. In addition,
employers face costs associated with employee education to reduce the
effects of co-worker fears.55
46 See Stephanie Armour, Firms Juggle Stigma, Needs More Workers with HIV;
Latest Drug Therapies Let More People with AIDS Go Back to Work, USA
TODAY, Sept. 7, 2002, at lB.
47 Id.
48 See Trapp, supra note 32, at 1585 n.1.
49 See Raymond Lin, ADA in Action: HIV and AIDS in the Workplace, in The
Body: An AIDS and HIVInformation Resources, 2 MID-ATLANTIC ADA 1 (1996),
at http://www.thebody.com/ada/winter96.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2002).
" See Turowski, supra note 10, at 162 (stating that courts have generally
regarded this employee complaint and defense with reservations).
51 Id. at 162-63.
52 See Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1297.
13 See Scope of the AIDS Problem, supra note 45.
14 See Mathiason & Berlin, supra note 26, at 653.
55 See, e.g., Armour, supra note 46 (stating that employers are increasingly
focusing on education in order to improve the work environment and avoid claims
of discrimination). For example, in the year 2000, Home Depot spent more than
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Although one study concluded that the cost to an employer of hiring an
HIV-positive worker ranged from $17,000 to $32,000 over a five-year
period, 6 many of the cited costs are considered improper in the debate
between employers and employees.5 7 For example, many of the economic
costs to employers, such as worker absenteeism, fall under reasonable
accommodations.5" However, the social and economic costs of excluding
HIV-positive individuals from the protections of the ADA is unquantifi-
able.
First, one of the most devastating effects of discrimination against HIV-
positive individuals is the effect the discrimination has on terminating the
spread of the disease. 9 Giving "direct threat" a broad interpretation and
removing the protections of the ADA permits employers to discriminate
against people with HIV. The Presidential Commission on the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic reported:
As long as discrimination occurs, and no strong national policy with
rapid and effective remedies against discrimination is established,
individuals who are infected with HIV will be reluctant to come forward
for testing, counseling, and care. This fear of potential discrimination...
will undermine our efforts to contain the HIV epidemic .... 60
$20,000 providing pamphlets to its employees and educating managers about HIV
and AIDS. Id. Ford is another example, providing AIDS education and condoms
to its employees. Id.
56 See Lin, supra note 49, at 1.
57 See, e.g., Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775 (6th
Cir. 1998).
58 
Id.
59 See Donald H. J. Hermann, The Development of AIDS Federal Civil Rights
Law: Anti-Discrimination Law Protection of Persons Infected with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, 33 IND. L. REv. 783, 787 (2000).
60H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 31(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 313 (quoting Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human Immuno-
deficiency Virus Epidemic 19 (1988)). The Report also stated:
HIV-related discrimination is impairing this nation's ability to limit the
spread of the epidemic. Crucial to this effort are epidemiological studies to
track the epidemic as well as the education, testing, and counseling of those
who have been exposed to the virus. Public health officials will not be able
to gain the confidence and cooperation of infected individuals or those at
high risk for infection if such individuals fear that they will be unable to
retain their jobs and their housing, and that they will be unable to obtain the
medical and support services they need because of discrimination based on
a positive HIV antibody test.
2002-2003]
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The second effect of discrimination is that it results in dependency of
the disabled worker and less overall productivity for employers, costing the
United States billions of dollars each year.6 The legislative history of the
ADA underscores the economic and social cost of "unwanted
dependency."'62 Related to the cost of dependency is the cost of depriving
the labor market of willing, able, and necessary workers.63 The Department
of Labor reported that many businesses could only meet their employment
needs by hiring outside of the mainstream.'
With regard to the individual with HIV, broad interpretations of risk
result in the multiplication of the effects of HIV. First, many disabled
individuals believe they are unable to obtain or to keep employment.6" Lack
of employment results in the inability to secure housing, food, treatment for
the disease, and other basic needs.66 Depression associated with the disease
is compounded by discriminatory reactions and lack of employment,
sometimes resulting in suicide.67 In fact, the House of Representatives
reported, regarding disabilities in general, that "'not working' is perhaps
the truest definition of what it means to be disabled in America. 68
C. Statutory Prohibitions Against Disability Discrimination
The two primary statutes protecting against disability discrimination in
the workplace are the Rehabilitation Act of 197369 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990.70
Id. See also Hermann, supra note 59, at 787.
61 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 43 (1990).
621 Id. (stating that discrimination "bind[s] many of the 36 million people into a
bondage of unjust, unwanted dependency on families, charity, and social welfare.
Dependency that is a major and totally unnecessary contributor to public deficits
and private expenditures.").
63 Id. at 44 (quoting President George H.W. Bush as stating, "The United States
is now beginning to face labor shortages .... The disabled offer a pool of talented
workers whom we simply cannot afford to ignore.. ").
4 Id. (citing testimony before House Subcommittees on Select Education and
Employment Opportunities, S. REP. No. 101-51, at 33 (Sept. 13, 1989)).
65 Id. at 32 (finding that sixty-six percent of unemployed, working-age disabled
Americans, or over eight million individuals, would prefer to be employed).
66 Id. at 31 (stating that Americans with disabilities are generally underprivi-
leged and disadvantaged).67 Id. at 42-43.
68 Id. at 32.
69 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-96 (2000).
7042 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12 (2000).
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1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The first major piece of legislation designed to protect individuals
against discrimination in the workplace was the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.'1 Section 504 of the act was designed to prevent discrimination
against persons with disabilities by the government, those contracting with
the government, and those receiving federal money from the government.72
The Act reads:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States,
as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or
his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted
by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
73
In 1974, Congress amended the Act to include the definition of disability.
74
It defined a person with a disability as a person who has a physical or
mental impairment "which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities. 75 In addition, a person is qualified as a person with a
disability if he or she had a record of impairment or was regarded as having
the impairment, as defined in the previous section.76 To promote enforce-
ment77 of the Act, President Gerald Ford issued an executive order
requiring the Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") to
issue regulations carrying out the Act.78
First, HEW issued a regulation defining "physical impairment" 79 as:
Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
71 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-96.
72 See id. § 794.
731 d. § 794(a).
74 Id. § 706(8)(B). See also Sch. Bd. ofNassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,
278 (1985). Note also that Congress substituted "disability" for "handicap"
subsequent to the defining amendment. See Pub. L. No. 102-569 § 102(p)(32)
(1992), 106 Stat. 4344.
715 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B). See also Arline, 480 U.S. at 278.
76 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B).
77 See Hermann, supra note 59, at 790.
78 Exec. Order No. 11,914, 43 Fed. Reg. 2132 (1976).
7945 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997). See also Arline, 480 U.S. at 280; Hermann,
supra note 59, at 790-91 (examining the development of disability law).
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neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including
speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary;
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine.
80
This regulation described the scope of mental and emotional disorders.
8'
Second, HEW issued a list of diseases covered by the statute, noting that
the list was instructive rather than exhaustive. 82 HEW listed the covered
diseases to include impairments of the senses, cerebral palsy, epilepsy,
cancer, diabetes, and alcoholism.83
Although the Rehabilitation Act was successful in vindicating the
rights of many disabled individuals, Congress thought its limitation to
federal agencies and their grantees was too narrow to serve such a broad
purpose.84 Thus, it enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.85
Congress' creation of the ADA to reflect the principles contained in the
Rehabilitation Act was not an accident.86 Thus, looking at the case law
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act can be helpful in interpreting the
ADA. The elements for proving an employment discrimination claim on the
basis of contagious disease as a disability are examined in the following
section.
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
To compensate for the disabled population unprotected by the
Rehabilitation Act, Congress enacted the ADA.87 One of the purposes listed
in the statute is "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including
the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce,
in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by
80 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(i) (1997).
8 1
/d.
82/d.
83 See Arline, 480 U.S. at 280 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84, App. A. (1997)).
84 See Turowski, supra note 10, at 144-45 (citing that the ADA covers employers
who do not get government funds).85 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2000).
86 See 26 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 9 (1999).
8742 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12 101(a)(4) ("The Congress
finds that... individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of
disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination.");
Turowski, supra note 10, at 145 (commenting on the ADA's expansive applica-
tion).
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people with disabilities.""8 Additionally, Congress' findings include the
following statement:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have
been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the
control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate
in, and contribute to, society.
8 9
Section 12112(a) of the ADA states, "No covered entity shall discrimi-
nate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability
of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 90 To
succeed, a plaintiff bringing an ADA claim must prove three elements. A
plaintiff must prove that she has a disability,91 that her employer discrimi-
nated against her because of her disability or failed to offer reasonable
accommodations for her disability,9 2 and that she is otherwise qualified for
the employment in question. 93
Although proof of intentional discrimination is an essential element of
the plaintiff's case, it is one of the less frequently litigated issues within the
context of the ADA and HIV litigation.94 Thus, it receives only brief
attention in this article. To satisfy the element, a plaintiff must show that
the employer breached one of its two duties under the ADA.9 The ADA
imposes both a duty of nondiscrimination and a duty to make reasonable
accommodations.96 A plaintiff asserting discrimination under the ADA
must also allege and prove that the discrimination was intentional.97 The
88 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).
'9Id. § 12101(a)(7).
9 1d. § 12112(a).
9' See Madox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1995).
92 id.
93 Id.
9 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 2-5 (examining whether termination or
exclusion based on communicable disease was appropriate if the subject posed a
direct threat to the health and safety of others).
95 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
961d. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
97 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 534 (1999) (stating that a
plaintiff must prove the discrimination was intentional).
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elements more relevant to HIV and ADA litigation, proof of disability and
that one is otherwise qualified for the employment, are examined below.
a. Proof of Disability
The ADA defines a disability as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" of an individ-
ual.98 As demonstrated below, the inquiry is usually approached as a three-
part test. 99 The current regulations define "physical or mental impairment"
using identical terminology as in the Rehabilitation Act.' 0
At one time, courts were split as to whether asymptomatic HIV patients
qualified as disabled under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.'0 ' In
School Board ofNassau County v. Arline, the United States Supreme Court
held that tuberculosis, as it affected the plaintiff, was a disability under the
9 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). See also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,
630 (1998) (quoting the ADA). The ADA also provides that one has a disability
if he or she has a record of such impairment or is regarded as having the impair-
ment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)-(C). See also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (stating that a person is disabled for purposes of the statute
if the employer perceives the individual as having an impairment which she does
not have or if the employer perceives an actual impairment of the individual to be
limiting when it is not).
99 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631. To determine if it is a disability, the court
considers if HIV was a physical impairment; identifies the life activity and
considers if it is a major one under the ADA; and then asks whether the impairment
substantially limits the major life activity. Id.
1042 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
101 Compare Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) with Ennis
v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995). Prior
to the Arline and Bragdon decisions, advocacy for the inclusion of HIV as an
impairment under the ADA was restricted to law reviews and other academic
publications. See Hermann, supra note 59, at 791 (citing Arthur S. Leonard,
Employment Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV.
681 (1985), as an early publication on the issue). The Department of Justice also
preceded the courts in determining that HIV and AIDS are a disability warranting
ADA protections; see Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Cooper on
Application of Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act to Persons with AIDS, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 122 at D-1 (June 25, 1986). There is also legislative history
to the ADA evincing expressly the intent of Congress to include HIV as a protected
disability. See Hermann, 'supra note 59, at 831-32 n.371 (citing 136 Cong. Rec.
H2626-01 (1990) (Representative McDermott stating, "I am particularly pleased
that this act will finally also extend necessary protection to people with HIV
disease.")).
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Rehabilitation Act.0 2 After the Arline decision, several courts viewed the
Rehabilitation Act, and later the ADA, as applicable to persons with
HIV.l0 3 However, many courts did not.'0 4
In 1998, the Supreme Court held that the ADA is applicable to persons
infected with HIV, although HIV is not a per se disability.0 5 In Bragdon v.
Abbott, the plaintiff, Sidney Abbott, brought an ADA claim against Randon
Bragdon, a dentist who refused to treat her because she was HIV-
positive.'0 6 The Court cited the statute in defining disability as "a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual. . "."."0' The Court examined that standard
under a three-step analysis.'0 8 First, the Court analyzed whether HIV was
a physical impairment. 9 Second, the Court considered whether the
identified activity was a major life activity. ll Third, the Court examined
102 See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1985).
113 See, e.g., Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446.
' See Ennis, 53 F.3d at 60.
105 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). Although Bragdon is a case
involving discrimination in the enjoyment of public accommodations, the Court's
holding is applicable to employment discrimination cases for its designation of HIV
as a covered disability. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 302, 42
U.S.C. § 12182(a) ("No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation
by any person who ... operates a place of public accommodation."); see also
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629 (citing the Americans with Disabilities Act). The statute
further provides that public accommodations include the offices of health care
providers. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F)).
The categorization of asymptomatic HIV as a disability under the ADA has
been widely criticized. See Christiana M. Ajalat, Note, Is HIVReally a "Disabil-
ity"?: The Scope of the Americans with Disabilities Act after Bragdon v. Abbott,
118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 751, 760 (1999) (criticizing
the expansive interpretation of the ADA and the designation of reproduction as a
major life activity). But see Doe v. County of Centre, Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 447 (3d
Cir. 2001) (interpreting Bragdon as holding that HIV is a per se disability). See
also Hermann, supra note 59, at 801-02 (noting that most courts presume that HIV-
infection is a disability, thus focusing litigation on whether an individual presents
a direct threat to the health or safety of others).
'16 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628-29.
1"7 Id. at 630 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1990)).
108 See id. at 632-42.
09 Id. at 632.
H Id. at 637.
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whether the impairment, HIV, "substantially limited" the "major life
activity" the plaintiff asserted."'
In determining whether HIV is a physical impairment, the Court cited
the pertinent regulations." 2 After reviewing the biological progression of
HIV from transmission through death," 3 the Court held that HIV is an
impairment "from the moment of infection.""' 4 Notably, the Court termed
the asymptomatic phase as a "misnomer" because "clinical features persist
throughout," and held that HIV is an impairment in each phase of the
disease.'
Second, the Court examined whether HIV affects a major life
activity.1 6 Although Abbott asserted, and the Court limited its examination
to, reproduction as the major life activity, the Court strongly indicated that
HIV would have a substantial impact on a number of major life activities." 7
I Id. at 639.
"
2 Id. at 632 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997)).
'3 Id. at 633-37.
14 Id. at 637. The Supreme Court stated:
The assault on the immune system is immediate. The victim suffers from a
sudden and serious decline in the number of white blood cells. There is no
latency period. Mononucleosis-like symptoms often emerge between six
days and six weeks after infection, at times accompanied by fever,
headache, enlargement ofthe lymph nodes (lymphadenopathy), muscle pain
(myalgia), rash, lethargy, gastrointestinal disorders, and neurological
disorders.
Id. at 635. The Court also based its decision in large part on the legislative history
of the ADA. See, e.g., id. at 642 (citing Application of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act to HIV-Infected Individuals, 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 264,
264-65 (1988), which stated that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 "protects
symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals against discrimination in
any covered program"); see also id. at 644 (citing numerous cases where juris-
dictions uniformly treated asymptomatic HIV as a handicap). The Court also noted
that "Congress was well aware of the position taken by the OLC [Office of Legal
Counsel] when enacting the ADA and intended to give that position its active
endorsement." Id. at 645.
"5 Id. at 635.
16 Id. at 637.
"7 Id. The Court stated:
Given the pervasive, and invariably fatal, course of the disease, its effect
on major life activities of many sorts might have been relevant to our
inquiry.... it may seem legalistic to circumscribe our discussion to the
activity of reproduction. We have little doubt that had different parties
brought the suit they would have maintained that an HIV infection imposes
substantial limitations on other major life activities.
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In holding that reproduction is a major life activity, the Court noted that
reproduction is "central to the life process itself," and rejected Bragdon's
contention that the activity must have a public or economic character."'8
Finally, the Court examined whether the HIV infection substantially
limited the major life activity of reproduction." 9 The Court cited two
reasons in support of its holding that HIV infection substantially limits the
major life activity of reproduction. 2 First, the Court cited the risk of
infecting one's sexual partner.'21 Second, the Court cited the risk of
infecting the child. 122 In rejecting Bragdon's argument that any limitation
is insubstantial due to the ability to reduce the risks through drug therapy,
the Court held that a limitation need not be insurmountable and that any
lessening of the limitation through alternatives would have to take cost and
other inconveniences into account.
23
b. Otherwise Qualified and the Direct Threat Exception
Finally, a plaintiff must show that she is otherwise qualified for the
position. 124 A person is otherwise qualified under the ADA if she can
perform the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable
accommodation. 125 However, a person is not otherwise qualified for the
position if she poses a direct threat to others in the workplace.
126
... It is our practice to decide cases on the grounds raised...
Id. at 637-38; see also Hermann, supra note 59, at 861 (stating that the Supreme
Court intimated it would interpret "major life activit[y]" very broadly).
"8Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
"
9 Id. at 639.20 Id. at 639-41.
.2 Id. at 639 (citing DENNIS H. OSMOND, AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE (1997) and
Harry W. Haverkos & RobertJ. Battjes, Female-to-Male Transmission ofHIV, 268
JAMA 1855, 1856 (1992) for the proposition that heterosexual contact presents a
twenty-five percent risk of female-to-male transmission).
122 Id. at 640 (citing numerous studies placing the risk of mother-to-fetus
transmission between thirteen and forty-five percent).
,23 See id. at 640-41.
124 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
'25 d. Note that the statute gives broad discretion to employers in determining
the essential functions of the job. Id.
126 Id. § 12182(b)(3). See also Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273 (1985) (delineating the direct threat exception to the ADA and finding that an
individual who poses a significant risk to others in the workplace is not "otherwise
qualified" under the meaning of the statute).
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The United States Supreme Court first articulated the direct threat
defense 127 in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.'28 Gene Arline
contracted tuberculosis in 1957. '29 She began teaching for the Nassau
County School District in 1966, during a twenty-year period of
remission.3 However, between the years 1977 and 1978, Arline suffered
three relapses. 3' After both the second and third relapses, the School Board
placed her on paid leave." 2 Subsequent to holding a hearing, the Board
discharged Arline "'not because she had done anything wrong,' but
because of the 'continued reoccurrence [sic] of tuberculosis.' "33 Arline
filed suit under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.'4
The district court held in favor of the School Board, reasoning that
tuberculosis was not a handicap under the statute.'35 Additionally, the court
held that even if tuberculosis qualified as a handicap under the Rehabilita-
tion Act, the disease rendered Arline not otherwise qualified for the
position.3 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, holding that Arline's tuberculosis was a handicap under the
statute.137 It remanded the case to determine whether Arline was otherwise
qualified for the position and whether reasonable accommodations could
127 The term "defense" may be a misnomer because the circuits are split, and the
Supreme Court has not ruled, on whether the theory is part of the plaintiff's prima
facie case or whether it is an affirmative defense. Compare Nunes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that "direct threat" is
an affirmative defense that the defendant bears the burden of proving), with
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 142-44
(1st Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court recently declined to decide this issue. See
Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc. v. Rizzo, 531 U.S. 958 (2000); see also
Sullivan, supra note 14, at 599 n. 10 (noting that the direct threat exception is an
affirmative defense and citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) and 29
C.F.R. § 1630.15 (1992)); Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 56 (1st Cir.
1998) (noting that the direct threat provision is part of the plaintiff's prima facie
case).28 Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-89.
29 Id. at 276.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 id.
133 Id.
114 See id. at 277.
135 Id.
136 Id.
'Id. (citing Arline v. Sch. Bd. ofNassau County, 772 F.2d 759,764 (1 lth Cir.
1985)).
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be made to allow her to continue teaching.'38 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to examine two issues.'39 The first issue was whether Arline's
disease, tuberculosis, qualified as a handicap under the Rehabilitation
Act. 40 The second issue was whether the disease, assuming it was a
qualifying disability, rendered Arline not otherwise qualified for the
position of teaching.' 4'
On the first issue, whether tuberculosis rendered Arline handicapped
under the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court answered in the affirma-
tive. 42 The Court held that Arline's tuberculosis was an impairment
because it was a "'physiological disorder or condition ... affecting [her]
• . . respiratory [system].'"'43 Since the disease caused Arline to be
hospitalized, it "substantially limited" one or more of her major life
activities.'" Additionally, the Court held that Arline' s initial hospitalization
in 1957 constituted a record of impairment. 45 Thus, Arline was a handi-
capped individual under the statute.'46
On the second issue, whether tuberculosis rendered Arline not
otherwise qualified for the position of teaching, the Supreme Court
remanded, but not before delineating a rule that would become the subject
of much litigation.'47 The Court held that a person is not otherwise qualified
if he or she poses a significant risk to others and reasonable accommoda-
tions will not eliminate the risk.'48 The Court adopted a four-part test for
determining whether, in the context of contagious disease, a person
presents a significant risk to others. 4 9 The test, adopted from the brief of
the American Medical Association, examines:
'[findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given the
state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the
disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long the carrier
138 Id.
139 id.
'Id. at 280-86.
141 Id. at 287-89.
142 Id. at 286.
143 Id. at 281 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(i) (1985) (alterations in original)).
144id.
145 Id.
146Id.
"41 Id. at 288. See also Hermann, supra note 59, at 801-02 (noting that the focus
of ADA/HIV litigation is on the issue of whether an individual presents a direct
threat to the health or safety of others).
148 Arline, 480 U.S. at 288 n. 16.
Id. at 288.
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is infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to
third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and
will cause varying degrees of harm."
5 °
The Court further held that courts should "defer to the reasonable medical
judgments of public health officials."'' Remanding the case for further
findings of fact, the Supreme Court directed the district court to reexamine
the facts under the tests it set forth and to then determine if a significant
risk existed and whether it could be eliminated with reasonable accommo-
dations. 152
In 1988, one year after Arline was decided, Congress enacted an
amendment codifying the decision in the Rehabilitation Act.'53 Under the
amendment, a person is not otherwise qualified if he or she poses a "direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals."'54 Then, in 1990,
Congress included the same provision when it enacted the ADA.'55 The
ADA defines direct threat as "a significant risk to the health or safety of
others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation."'
15 6
However, in incorporating the defense into the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act, Congress unmistakably intended to codify Arline."' The legislative
history of the ADA provision contains express indications that "[t]he term
'direct threat' is meant to connote the full standard set forth in the Arline
decision."' 58 Thus, the four-part-test delineated in Arline is the intended
standard for applying the direct threat defense under the ADA. "' Although
Arline and the statutes provide concrete factors to examine, it is still
"' Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting Brief of the Am.
Med. Ass'n as Amicus Curiae 19).
5 ' Id. at 288.
1
52 Id. at 288-89.
"1' 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (1994). See also Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1304
(discussing the origins of the direct threat defense).
'54 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D).
'
55 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2002).
1561d. § 12111(3).
'57 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1304 n.146.
5 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 76, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 359). See also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45, reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 468 ("In order to determine whether an individual
poses a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace,
the Committee intends to use the same standard as articulated by the Supreme
Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.... This definition was added
to clarify that the direct threat standard is a codification of the analysis in Arline.").
9 See supra note 158.
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unclear what level of risk is a significant risk, allowing employers to
exclude individuals as direct threats to the health and safety of others.
160
This is the point of divergence for courts in determining whether an
individual with HIV is a direct threat to others in the workplace.1
61
III. THE DIFFERING VIEWS OF HIV AS A DIRECT THREAT
Most courts have relied on two primary, yet distinctly opposite,
approaches to whether HIV presents a direct threat to others in the
workplace. The first approach, demonstrated in Waddell v. Valley Forge
DentalAssociates, 16 gives a broad reading to the principles underlying the
direct threat exception. Thus, it narrows the applicability of the ADA. The
ADA, by its express terms, applies only to "individuals with a disability."
The issue is whether that phrase will be interpreted broadly or narrowly.
The second approach, demonstrated in Chalk v. United States District
Court Central District of California,'63 provides a narrower interpretation,
broadening the applicability of the ADA. There is one additional approach
taken by a few courts, demonstrated in Doe v. County of Centre,"64 which
lies between the Waddell and Chalk approaches and rests most closely to
the intent of Congress in drafting the direct threat provision. Each approach
is discussed below.
A. The Eleventh Circuit Approach: Theoretical + Fatal = Direct Threat
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Onishea v. Hopper,'
65
articulated a framework for determining whether the risk of transmission
of a contagious disease poses a significant risk to the health and safety of
161 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk
Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1479 (2001); see also Sullivan, supra note 14, at
617 (noting that "uncertainty exists at the most fundamental level" regarding how
the significance of the risk test should be applied).
161 Compare Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922,
924 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that "[a] cognizable risk of permanent duration with
lethal consequences suffices to make a surgical technician with Bradley's
responsibilities" a significant risk to patients), with Chalk v. United States Dist.
Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a theoretical
risk of transmission is insufficient to present a significant risk under the direct
threat standard).
162 Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275 (11 th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2293 (2002).
163 Chalk, 840 F.2d at 701.
164 Doe v. County of Centre, Pa., 242 F.3d 437 (3d Cir. 2001).
165 Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1299 (1l th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
segregation of HIV-positive prison inmates from the non-infected population did
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others, or a direct threat, rendering the plaintiff unqualified under the
ADA:
166
[A] showing of a specific and theoretically sound means of possible
transmission [is] enough to justify summary judgment against an HIV-
positive plaintiff on the ground that the infection pose[s] a "significant
risk" to others in the workplace, even though reported incidents of
transmission [are] few or nonexistent, and the odds of transmission [are]
admittedly small.1
67
The court used the same framework, described below, in determining
whether an HIV-positive dentist posed a direct threat to his patients,
rendering him unqualified for the protections of the ADA.
68
In Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffhygienist, Spencer
Waddell, was unqualified for protection of his employment under the ADA
because his impairment, HIV, posed a direct threat to the health and safety
of others. 69 Waddell was employed as a dental hygienist by Dr. Alan
Witkin for nearly two years when Valley Forge Dental Association
("Valley Forge"), took over the practice. 7 Valley Forge required its
employees to undergo medical testing including testing for HIV.' 71
Waddell's test results indicated that he had contracted HIV.'72 Valley Forge
placed Waddell on paid leave while deciding how to handle the situation. ,
73
After reviewing dental journals and consulting with the CDC, Valley Forge
concluded that Waddell posed a threat to the safety of the practice's
patients, discontinued his employment as a hygienist, and offered him a
clerical position at half of his previous salary. 74 Valley Forge fired
Waddell when he refused to accept the clerical position.1
75
not violate the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act because (1) there was a theoretical
risk of the transmission of the disease and (2) if the risk manifested itself, the result
would inevitably be fatal).
166 id.
167 See Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1282-83 (quoting Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1297). The
court also noted that the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have adopted the same
view. Id.
16' See id. at 1277-78.
1691d. at 1278.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 id.
175 Id.
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Waddell subsequently brought claims alleging violations of the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.76 Both parties moved for summary
judgment. 7 7 The major point of contention was whether Waddell posed a
direct threat to his patients, since Valley Forge conceded that the sole
motivation for the termination was Waddell's HIV status.17 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Valley Forge, finding that
Waddell was unqualified under the ADA because he posed a direct threat
to his patients.
179
The Eleventh Circuit declined to determine whether HIV was a per se
disability, specifically whether it will always affect a major life activity,
and limited review to whether the presumed disability was a direct threat
to Waddell's patients. 80 The court set forth the prima facie requirements
of a discrimination case under the ADA.' Waddell needed to establish that
he was disabled, that he was a qualified individual, and that he was
"subjected to unlawful discrimination because of [his] disability."'182 The
court noted that Waddell had the burden of proving that he was a qualified
individual; he must prove that "'he was not a direct threat [to his patients]
or that reasonable accommodations [to eliminate that threat] were avail-
able.' "183
Citing Arline, the court noted that a person who is a direct threat to the
health and safety of others is not an otherwise qualified individual under
the ADA.'84 The court then defined direct threat as "'a significant risk to
the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
'79 Id. at 1278-79. Waddell's claim under the Rehabilitation Act was so ruled
on because Waddell did not produce any evidence that Valley Forge received
financial assistance from the government, thereby rendering the statute inapplica-
ble. Id. at 1279 n.2. The court also noted that the Rehabilitation Act was waived
because Waddell did not address the district court's rationale in his brief. Id. at
1279-80 n.3. It found that the waiver was irrelevant since both claims would have
been disposed of using the same analysis. Id.
1801 d. at 1280 n.4.
181 See id. at 1279.
182 Id. (citing Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) and 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000)).
1 81Id. at 1280 (citing LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 836
( lth Cir. 1998)).
114 Id. (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.16
(1987)).
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accommodation."" 5 The court listed the four factors from Arline for
determining whether a person carrying an infectious disease is a direct
threat to others.
18 6
First, regarding the nature of the risk, the court noted the district court's
observation that a risk would arise from "contact between Waddell's blood
and an open wound or mucous membrane of a patient." ' 7 Second, the
circuit court reiterated the district court's holding that the duration of the
risk is indefinite since there is currently no cure for HIV.188 Third,
regarding the severity of the risk, the district court held that it was very
severe because death is the inevitable outcome of HIV.'89 The Eleventh
Circuit found the fourth element, in which the district court analyzed "the
probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees
of harm," to be the most relevant in Waddell's case.
190
The court cited testimony that many routine dental procedures cause
bleeding in patients.1 9' It also cited testimony that exposure of a hygienist's
blood during procedures is a common risk.'92 Both parties conceded the
theoretical possibility of exposure of a patient to a dentist's blood, which
could result in transmission of HIV to a patient. 193 Although the court also
cited a CDC report that dental-hand trauma is common,'94 the court did not
engage in a true analysis of the fourth factor delineated by the Supreme
Court: 95 "the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause
varying degrees of harm."'196 Rather, the court used the standard set forth in
185 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (2000)).
186 Id.
"'87Id. at 1281.
188 id.
189 Id.
'9 Id. at 1280.
'9' See id. at 1282-84 (citing Waddell's testimony that blood is usually present
with scaling and root planing procedures); id. (citing Brief for Appellant at 33)
(admitting that "patient bleeding during a routine dental checkup is a common
experience").
192 See id. at 1282-84 (noting the possibility that a dentist could cut himself with
the sharp instruments commonly employed and also noting that Waddell had cut
himself during routine procedures).
19' Id. at 1283.
194 Id. (citing Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Update: Universal
Precautions for Prevention of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus,
Hepatitis B Virus, and Other Bloodborne Pathogens in Health-Care Settings, 37
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 379 (June 24, 1988)).
195 Id. at 1279-84.
196 Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987).
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Onishea.'97
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit, in Waddell, held that" 'when transmitting
a disease inevitably entails death, the evidence supports a finding of "sig-
nificant risk" if it shows both (1) that a certain event can occur, and (2) that
according to reliable medical opinion the event can transmit the disease."' 198
This approach is consistent with the holdings of the Fourth,' Fifth2' and
197 See Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1283 (quoting Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289,
1297 (1 1th Cir. 1999)).
198 Id. at 1280-81 (quoting Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1299).
19 Id. at 1283 (noting that the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits entertain the
same approach). See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th
Cir. 1995). In University ofMaryland Medical System, the plaintiff Doe, a surgical
resident at the defendant institution, was stuck in the course of his work by a needle
infected with HIV. Id. at 1262. After testing revealed that Doe was infected with
the HIV virus as a result of the incident, he was suspended from performing
surgical procedures. Id. Initially, the University ofMaryland Medical System Corp.
("UMMSC") allowed him to perform reduced risk surgical procedures. Id.
However, after further consultation and research, UMMSC permanently suspended
Doe from performing any surgical procedures, offering non-surgical residencies as
an alternative. Id. at 1263. Although the court cited the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention ("CDC") reports, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Update, supra note 194, at 379, stating that the chance of surgeon-to-patient
transmission of HIV was 1 in 42,000 to 1 in 420,000; that the CDC identified only
one exposure prone procedure; that there are no documented cases of surgeon-to-
patient HIV infection; and that the Supreme Court, inArline, 480 U.S. at 288, held
that great deference should be given to the findings of public health officials, the
court nonetheless held that Doe presented a significant risk, or direct threat, to
UMMSC's patients. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d at 1265-67. The court only briefly
mentioned the factors in Arline and essentially held that the mere possibility of
transmission, coupled with the definite fatality upon transmission, rendered Doe's
continued practice as a surgeon a significant risk to others. Id.
200 See, e.g., Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922
(5th Cir. 1993). In Bradley, the plaintiff, a surgical assistant with the defendant
medical center, announced in a newspaper that he was HIV-positive. Id. at 923. He
was almost immediately removed from surgical duties and given an administrative
position offering no client contact. Id. The court first outlined the Arline factors:
nature, duration, and severity of the risk, the probabilities the disease will be
transmitted, and the varying degrees of harm. Id. at 924 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at
288). Noting that the parties did not dispute the first three factors, the court went
(ostensibly) immediately to the fourth factor. Id. However, the court summarily
stated, with little review of medical evidence, that "[a] cognizable risk of
permanent duration with lethal consequences suffices to make a surgical technician
with Bradley's responsibilities" a significant risk to patients. See id. Essentially, the
court, as in Waddell and University of Maryland Medical System, held that any
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Sixth Circuits.2"'
The refusal of the court to entertain any real balancing or determination
of actual probabilities, and its acceptance of any theoretical risk of transmis-
sion, suggests a very broad interpretation of "significant risk."2°2 While it is
an open question as to how minute a risk will be considered significant, the
court's analysis indicates that any person who is HIV-positive will always
present a significant risk, and thus be a direct threat to others in the work-
place.
possibility of transmission, coupled with the effects should a transmission occur,
made Bradley's employment as a surgical technician a direct threat to patients,
therefore removing ADA protections.
201 See, e.g., Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398 (6th Cir.
1998). In Mauro, the plaintiff Mauro, a surgical technician employed by the
defendant Borgess, was HIV-positive. Id. at 400. When Mauro's illness came to
the attention of Borgess officials, they created a position for Mauro that involved
no client contact. Id. Mauro refused to accept the position. Id. Borgess officials
subsequently created a task force to investigate whether Mauro could continue in
his former position without posing a direct threat to the safety of patients. Id. When
the task force determined that Mauro could no longer serve as a surgical technician
and he refused to accept the alternate position, Mauro was laid off. Id. The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in awarding summaryjudgment
to Borgess because Mauro presented a direct threat to its patients. Id. at 407. The
court set forth the factors for determining whether Mauro's HIV-positive status
was a direct threat to Borgess's patients: the nature, duration, and severity of the
risk and "the probability that the disease will be transmitted." Id. at 401 (citing
Arline, 480 U.S. at 288). It should be noted that the court modified the fourth factor
from "the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying
degrees of harm," Arline, 480 U.S. at 188, to "the probability that the disease will
be transmitted." Mauro, 137 F.3d at 400. The Mauro court heavily stressed that the
proper inquiry is the probability of transmission and not the possibility. Id. at 403.
However, the court relied heavily on the reasoning in Bradley and University of
Maryland Medical System, deeming Mauro as "indistinguishable" from those
cases. Id. at 401. Yet, Bradley and University of Maryland Medical System are
already noted for their holdings that a mere possibility of transmission of HIV is
a direct threat, removing ADA protections. See supra notes 199-200. The court
cited extensive testimony looking at Mauro's actual duties and typical duties of
other surgical technicians. Mauro, 137 F.3d at 404-07. The court also cited the
same CDC information, contained in those cases, finding risk of transmission to be
slight. Id. at 403-05. Affirming the district court's decision in favor of Borgess, the
circuit court found Mauro's employment as a surgical technician to be a direct
threat to patients. Id. at 407. The court reached this decision despite the lack of
evidence that risk of transmission was more than negligible or that Mauro himself
had ever been cut during a procedure. Id. at 406-16.
202 See Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1283-84.
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B. The Ninth Circuit Approach: Only Documented Cases of Transmission
Can Show a Direct Threat
Opposite the Eleventh Circuit approach, where any theoretical and
remote chance of transmission renders one a direct threat to the safety of
others,20 3 is the Ninth Circuit approach, where proof of a documented case of
transmission is required before the protections of the Rehabilitation Act or the
ADA are removed.2 4 In Chalky. United States District Court CentralDistrict
of California, the Ninth Circuit used this approach in finding that a school
department violated the Rehabilitation Act when it prohibited an IV-positive
teacher from having student contact.20 5
Orange County Department of Education employed Vincent Chalk as a
teacher for hearing-impaired students for nearly six years.20 6 Chalk discovered
that he had HIV after developing pneumocystis carninii pneumonia.2 7
Although Chalk's physician released him to resume teaching and so notified
the Department, the Department placed him on administrative leave.208 During
Chalk's leave, the Department consulted epidemiological specialists and
reports to discern whether Chalkpresented a riskto his students.20 9 The doctor
performing that review also examined Chalk and cleared him to return to
teaching.210 After Chalk's agreed leave period expired, the Department
offered him an administrative position involving no student contact, which he
was required to accept under threat of an injunction.' When Chalk refused
to accept the position, both parties cross-filed for injunctions.2"2 Chalk also
alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.213
203 Id. See also supra notes 167-202 and accompanying text (discussing
Waddell).
204 See Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701
(1988). For a positive review of the Chalk decision, see Trapp, supra note 32, at
1641. See also Turowski, supra note 10, at 149 (stating that the Chalk decision
"presents a well-reasoned employment discrimination case utilizing extensive
medical evidence on Chalk's behalf').
205 Chalk, 840 F.2d at 701-12.206 Id. at 703.
207 Id.
20
8 Id.
209 id.
210 Id. at 703 n.4.
211 Id. at 703.
2 2 Id. at 703-04. The Department subsequently dropped the action in state court
and counterclaimed against Chalk's claims in federal court. Id. at 704.213Id. at 703.
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The district court denied Chalk's motion for a preliminary injunction. The
court found that his success on the merits was unlikely because although the
risk that HIV would be transmitted to a student was minimal, it would suffice
to defeat this claim.214 The Department permanently assigned Chalk to
administrative duties involving no student contact."'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit set forth the legal standard for determining
whether Chalk was a direct threat to others in the workplace.216 In the disease
context, a person is a direct threat to others in the workplace if there is a
significant risk of transmitting the disease to others.217 Then, the court cited
the fourArline factors for determining whether a risk is significant: the nature,
duration, and severity of the risk, and the probability that the disease will be
transmitted balanced with the harm to be produced.218
The Ninth Circuit held that it was error for the district court to equate a
"minimal" risk of death with the "significant" risk required by the statute,
especially when the risk assessment was based on the lack of information as
to actual risks in that setting.219 The court also found that the district court did
not follow the legal standard of deferring to public health officials and of
relying on objective medical evidence.22° The court reviewed the evidence
presented by both parties.221 The plaintiff Chalk cited many of the same
medical authorities, such as the CDC, as did the plaintiffs in the cases
discussed above, demonstrating that there is little risk of transmission. The
Department introduced evidence that, although the risk was very small, a risk
did, in fact, exist.
223
The Ninth Circuit held that a risk that is theoretical, because no such risk
has manifested in transmission, cannot be a significant risk.224 In other words,
risk of transmission can only be significant, or a direct threat, if there is a
documented case of such transmission.22 ' The court looked to several
214 Id.
215 id.
216 Id. at 704-05.
2171 d. at 705 (citing Arline v. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, 480 U.S. 273, 288
n.16 (1987)).
218 Id. (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 288).
219 Id. at 707-08.
22
1 Id. at 708 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 288).
221 Id. at 706-09.
222 See id. at 709.
223 Id. at 707.
224 Id. at 706; see also Doe v. County of Centre, Pa., 242 F.3d 437 (3d Cir.
2001).
225 See Chalk, 840 F.2d at 706-09.
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decisions of other courts that rejected the "theoretical risk" as a significant
risk amounting to a direct threat.226 Since there were no documented cases of
transmission of H1V, either from teacher to student or in other casual contact
settings, the Ninth Circuit found that Chalk was not a direct threat to his
students and co-workers.227 Since he was not a direct threat, Chalk was
otherwise qualified and success on the merits was likely.228 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit ordered that the injunction be granted.229
Other courts have interpreted Chalk as standing for the proposition that
in order for a risk to be significant, there must be a documented case of
transmission.2" This case improves upon Waddell in that it calls for a
completely objective standard, making bias about HIV almost irrelevant.231
However, Chalk departs from congressional intent by failing to give attention
to the need to protect employers.2 2 Essentially, the court's ruling renders the
direct threat provision useless in cases where there is an obvious risk but the
risk has not manifested. Thus, employers may be forced to shoulder risks that
the direct threat provision was designed to protect them (and their employees
and customers) against.
226 Id. at 708-09; see, e.g., Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F.
Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that an HIV-positive child could not be
excluded from the classroom because there was no evidence that HIV could be
transmitted through biting); Ray v. Sch. Dist. of DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp.
1524, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that "future theoretical [risk of] harm" was
insufficient to find that three HIV-positive brothers posed a direct threat to others
in the classroom); Dist. 27 Conty. Sch. Bd. v. Bd. of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325,
337 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (holding that excluding HIV-positive students from the
classroom based on a "remote theoretical possibility" of transmission violated the
Rehabilitation Act); N.Y. State Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644
(2d Cir. 1979) (holding that a "remote possibility" that hepatitis B would be
transmitted to other children was insufficient to support excluding the infected
child from the classroom).
227 See Chalk, 840 F.2d at 707-09.
228 Id. at 711.
229Id. at 712.
230 See, e.g., Doe v. County of Centre, Pa., 242 F.3d 437 (3d Cir. 2001). In Doe,
the court stated: "Other appellate courts have endorsed a more exacting standard,
requiring some actual risk of transmission including documented cases. See...
Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal.,..." Id. at 450.
231 Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1283-84 (11 th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2293 (2002).
232 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2000).
2002-2003]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
C. The Third Circuit Approach: True Analytical Engagement
Between the approaches of the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits, is the Third
Circuit approach.233 The Third Circuit approach adheres to Congressional
intent by requiring that a certain probability of HIV-transmission exist. In Doe
v. County of Centre, the plaintiffs sought to become foster parents in Centre
County, Pennsylvania.3 The County conditioned approval of their applica-
tion upon the Does signing a release allowing the birthparents of potential
foster children to become aware of the HIV-positive status of the Does'
already adopted son.235 The County reasoned that foster children often commit
sexual assault on other children in the home, presenting a risk of IV
transmission to the offending child.236 The Does sued under the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act for monetary and injunctive relief, including approval as
foster parents and elimination of the policy.237 Granting summary judgment
in favor of the County, the district court found that the UIV-positive son
posed a direct threat to foster children because of the potential that the
adopted son would be sexually assaulted by the foster child.23
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
district court and remanded the case for trial.239 The court reviewed the
holdings of the Fourth,240 Fifth,24' Sixth,242 and Eleventh Circuits,243 that "any
amount of risk through a 'specific and theoretically sound means of transmis-
233 County of Centre, 242 F.3d at 437.
234 Id. at 441.
235 Id. Although the Does did not themselves qualify as "handicapped" under
the Rehabilitation Act or as having a "physical impairment" under the ADA, they
had standing to sue, as "qualified individuals," through their association with a
qualifying individual. Id, at 447 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2000) for the
proposition that "the ADA 'protects persons who associate with persons with
disabilities and who are discriminated against because of that association. This may
include family, friends, and persons who provide care for persons with disabili-
ties.' ").236 Id. at 441, 444-45.
23 7 Id.
238 Id. at 441,446.
2391 d. at 441.
240 Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1265-66 (4th Cir.
1995).
241 Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924 (5th
Cir. 1993).
242 Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 405, 407 (6th Cir.
1998).
243 Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1297-99 (1 lth Cir. 1999).
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sion' constitutes a significant risk."2" It also reviewed the First245 and Ninth24 6
Circuit decisions stating, "[o]ther appellate courts have endorsed a more
exacting standard, requiring some actual risk of transmission including
documented cases., 247 However, the court did not examine the merits of the
approaches because it held that a reasonable fact finder could find the risk of
transmission to be so remote as to remove the case from the purview of the
direct threat exception.248
First, the court examined Bragdon to determine the appropriate standard.
Citing that case, the Third Circuit wrote, "'the ADA do[es] not ask whether
a risk exists, but whether it is significant." 249 Second, the court stated that the
inquiry would require a "statistical likelihood."250 Finally, the court discussed
the four Arline factors for examining whether a contagious disease presents
a direct threat to the health and safety of others.2 1
In applying the standard, the Third Circuit agreed with the lower court's
analysis of the first three Arline factors. However, it disagreed with the lower
court's analysis of the fourth factor--the probability of transmission.252 The
court noted the requirement of an individualized inquiry as it examined the
facts of the case.253 Two key facts were important to the court's determination.
First, the Doe's son was severely physically disabled, needing assistance to
feed and clothe himself.254 Second, the Does requested that foster children
placed in their home be under the age of twelve.255 The County presented
evidence that foster children perpetrate sexual abuse at a high rate.256
However, the court found that the Doe's son was very unlikely to be able to
assault another child; and a pre-pubescent child, under the age of twelve, was
also unlikely to commit such acts.257 Although there was a remote risk that
244 County of Centre, 242 F.3d at 450.
245 Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 1999).
246 Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701, 707-09
(9th Cir. 1988).
247 County of Centre, 242 F.3d at 450.
248 id.
249 Id. at 447 (quoting Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649).
250 Id. (quoting Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 652).
251 Id. at 447-48 (quoting Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1987)).252 Id. at 449.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 442, 449.
255 Id. at 449.
2 56 Id.
257 Id. at 449-50.
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such an assault could occur, the court held that there was sufficient evidence
for a jury to conclude that placement of foster children in the Does' home
would not present a direct threat to the health Or safety of those children.258
Thus, the court held in favor of the Does and remanded the case for a direct
threat determination at trial.259
The opinion in County of Centre is important for two reasons. First, it is
an acknowledgement and review of the existing approaches to HIV as a
direct threat.26 Second, it represents a middle ground between those
approaches.261 It is an example of the court acting in accordance with Supreme
Court guidelines and statutory law rather than out of fear or theoretical
situations.
IV. ANALYSIS
The ADA has been regarded as "mark[ing] 'the beginning of a new era
for individuals with disabilities.' ,262 However, the use of stereotypes in
conjunction with the direct threat provision reduces the promise of that "new
era" by removing the protections of the ADA from those who need it most:
HIV-positive individuals. 263 The problems associated with implementing the
direct threat provision also arise from the lack of guidance in interpreting
"significant risk.' '2 ' This section examines the disparity in treatment of the
direct threat defense by looking at the role of myths and stereotypes in
evaluating risk.
A. The Role of Stereotypes in Implementing the Direct Threat Defense
Three aspects of HIV stereotypes are relevant to the examination of risk
evaluation. The first aspect is the intent of Congress to defeat stereotypes
imposed on individuals with disabilities. The second aspect is the role of
211 Id. at 450-51.
2591d. at 451.
260 Id. at 450.
261 Compare id. with Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289 (1 1th Cir. 1999) and
Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988)
(showing the two extreme ends of the spectrum in analyzing HIV transmission for
purposes of a direct threat).262 Trapp, supra note 32, at 1596 (quoting Renee L. Cyr, Note, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: Implications for Job Reassignment and the Treatment of
Hypersusceptible Employees, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 1237, 1237 (1992)).
263 See generally Sullivan, supra note 14, at 621-22.
264 See Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1280-8 1.
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stereotypes in public risk assessment. The third aspect is the effect of public
fears on the judiciary in regard to its role as risk regulator.265
1. Congressional Purpose, Agency Definition and the Supreme Court
The legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress sought to
eliminate and provide redress against discrimination in the workplace based
on stereotypes imposed on individuals with disabilities .2' The House report,
based on hearings leading to the passage of the ADA, states that discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities "often results from false presump-
tions, generalizations, misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance,
irrational fears, and pernicious mythologies.,2" In regards to such discrimina-
tion in the workplace, the report stated, and Congress included in the statutory
findings,268 that individuals with disabilities "have been subjected to unequal
and discriminatory treatment in a range of areas, based on characteristics that
are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypical
assumptions, fears and myths not truly indicative of the ability of such
individuals to participate in and contribute to society., 269 Thus, one of
Congress' primary purposes in drafting the ADA was to fight the stereotypes
that prevent individuals with disabilities from becoming full participants in
society.27°
The logical conclusion based on the intent of Congress in regards to the
entire Act is that, in drafting the direct threat provision, Congress did not
intend to allow myths and stereotypes to determine which disabled individuals
are a threat to those whom they come into contact.' Thus, Congress did not
intend to impart those mythologies into the examination of the significance
265 See id. at 1281.
266 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 30, 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 312, 338. See generally Sullivan, supra note 14, at 599-600
(discussing the effect of stereotypes on perceptions of risk).
267 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 30.
268 See 42 U.S.C. § 1211 l(a)(7) (2002).
269 H.R. REP. No. 10 1-485, pt. 2, at 40.
270 See Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1280.
271 Id.; see Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275 (1 lth Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2293 (2002) (finding that a remote risk of
transmitting HIV to dental patients was a significant risk under the direct threat
provision of the ADA); Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th
Cir. 1995) (finding that a remote and theoretical risk of transmitting HIV to the
patients of a medical assistant was a significant risk under the direct threat
provision of the ADA).
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of the risk. In drafting the direct threat provision, Congress "sought a proper
reconciliation of the legitimate interests of employers, on the one hand, and
the rights of individuals with disabilities" to be free from discrimination.272
However, as recent case law demonstrates,273 even analysis of the most
objective evidence can be laden with value judgments.274 The lack of guidance
for interpreting direct threat has left individuals open to discrimination based
on stereotypes.
2. Science, Values, and Stereotypes in Risk Evaluation
The Supreme Court, in Arline, found that fears about disability are just
as disabling as the physical impact of a disease,275 and stated that "[flew
aspects of a handicap give rise to the same level of public fear and misappre-
hension as contagiousness." '276 This statement encapsulates the AIDS
epidemic and the continuing panic of the nation.277 In addition, people fear
most what is "unfamiliar, uncontrollable, and highly publicized."278 Although
less so in recent years, this statement also accurately captures fears about HIV
and AIDS.279 Unfortunately, public fears, no matter how unfounded, often
turn into governmental policy.28°
The methods people use in everyday life to evaluate risk explain why
perceptions of risks and diseases often do not reflect scientific and medical
conclusions. Richard Pildes and Cass Sunstein have identified eight factors
that people use in risk evaluation:
(1) the catastrophic nature of the risk; (2) whether the risk is uncontrollable;
(3) whether the risk involves irretrievable or permanent losses; (4) the social
conditions under which a particular risk is generated and managed, a point
that connects to issues of consent, voluntariness, and democratic control;
272 See Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1282.
273 Compare Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d at 1261, with Chalk v. United States Dist.
Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
274 See Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1281-84.
275 Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
2 7 6 Id.
277 See Padraig O'Malley, Editor's Note to THE AIDS EPIDEMIC: PRIVATE
RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 5-6 (Padraig O'Malley ed., 1996).
278 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1281; see also Hermann, supra note 59, at 787;
Sullivan, supra note 14, at 621-22 (noting that public fear of AIDS only really
began after persons infected by HIV-positive blood transfusions began to surface).
279 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 621-22.
280 See Bagenstos, supra note 160, at 1488.
[VOL. 91
HIV AND THE DIRECT THREAT DEFENSE
(5) how equitably distributed the danger is or how concentrated on
identifiable, innocent, or traditionally disadvantaged victims, which ties to
both notions of community and moral ideals; (6) how well understood the
risk process in question is, a point that bears on the psychological distur-
bance produced by different risks; (7) whether the risk would be faced by
future generations; and (8) how familiar the risk is.
281
Application of these factors to -IV and AIDS helps explain the public's
intense reaction to the disease.
H1V and AIDS are inevitably fatal diseases.282 Although improvements
in pharmaceutical and medical technologies improve life span, death is
inevitable in most cases.283 Even assuming a guaranteed life span, one cannot
indulge in some of the normal life processes for fear of transmitting the
disease to others.2' Thus, the first factor, the catastrophic nature of the risk,
and the third factor, whether losses resulting from the risk are permanent,285
suggest aggravated reactions to the risk of HIV.
The second, fourth, and fifth factors, involving the controllability,
distribution, and level of choice regarding risk,286 suggest an intense reaction
to the risks of H1V and AIDS. Public perception of the controllability of HIV
and AIDS was not an initial concern because the disease appeared only to
infect the gay male and the African-American populations.287 That view
rapidly changed when iHV began to manifest itself in the young heterosexual
Caucasian population.288
The same aggravated reaction is also suggested by the sixth and eighth
factors, the comprehension of the risk process and the familiarity of the
risk.289 HIV is a relatively new epidemic compared to how it was first defined
281 Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62
U. CHw. L. REv. 1, 57 (1995).
282 See Mathiason & Berlin, supra note 26, at 637. See also Sullivan, supra note
14, at 599 n.8 (giving a brief, yet comprehensive description of the progression of
HIV).
283 See supra note 282.
284 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639-42 (1998).
285 Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 281, at 57.
286 id.
287 See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 621 (stating "the disease was thought to affect
only the 'margins' of society--gay and bisexual men...
288 Id. at 621-24.
289 Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 281, at 57.
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in 1982.29' Although billions of dollars have funded AIDS research, and
scientists almost universally agree that the modes of transmission have
exhaustively been identified, the public still fears that it does not know
enough to protect itself against the disease.291 Inferentially, therefore, people
take unwarranted precautions against its transmission.
The subjective risk evaluation factors discussed above have numerous
implications with regard to examining the significance of the risk in HIV
cases. Most of the factors above indicate that a heightened fear of HIV and
AIDS, although it may be unwarranted by science, can impact judicial
perceptions and methods of evaluating risks. Thus, the perceptions become
key factors in gate-keeping who is protected by the ADA.
3. The Propriety of the Judiciary as Risk Regulators
In 1990, the Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court stated
during an oral argument, "I wouldn't work within 500 yards of anyone who
tested positive for HIV. I have a wife and children." '292 One might wonder
how he expects to get HIV sitting behind his bench, fully covered with his
robe, and fully guarded by his bailiff. One might also wonder if he has
resigned, given the high rate of HIV-infection among the criminal population
that sit in his courtroom. Nevertheless, the Justice's statement is illustrative
of the potential bias infecting the significance of the risk evaluation.2 93
A number of commentators have urged that the task of defining the
significance of the risk be abrogated from the judiciary.2 94 Bias295 is the most
frequently cited reason for removal. Another reason cited is the lack of
judicial expertise in the areas of science and medicine.296
Although concerns overjudicial bias are supported by case law, removing
such decisions from the judiciary cannot be rationally supported for several
29 Loretta McLaughlin, Aids: An Overview, in THE AIDS EPIDEMIC, supra note
277, at 18.
291 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIVand its Transmis-
sion, at http://www.cdc.gov/health/diseases.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2002).
292See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 600 n. 12 (citing West Virginia Supreme Court
Rules State's Rights Act Protects HIV-Positive, 55 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-8
(Mar. 21, 1990)).
293 Id. at 607.
294 See generally id. See also Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1281 ("Too often...
judges' personal perceptions of acceptable risks and medical probabilities stand in
for the rigorous scrutiny demanded by the ADA.").
295 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 607; see also Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1281.
296 See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 607.
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reasons. First, the legislative history of the ADA commands that a direct
threat determination be made by an individualized judicial inquiry.297 Second,
the Supreme Court mandates an inquiry into the threat posed by a specific
individual.298 Blanket application of the direct threat provision would be
contrary to the above mandates and the underpinnings of the ADA: to base
employment decisions on the abilities of individuals and not on the perceived
abilities of a class of persons with a particular disease.299
B. The True Meaning ofSignificance of the Risk
As noted above, a primary goal for Congress in enacting the ADA was to
defeat the stereotypes associated with disability.3"' Yet, a number of circuits
appear to have imparted such stereotypes into the meaning of direct threat,
resulting in a defeat of that purpose.3"1 Other circuits have also failed to give
meaning to the intended balance between employer interests and the rights of
the disabled by interpreting the risk too narrowly.30 2 The ADA, as a valuable
piece of legislation, should be interpreted with the meaning that Congress
intended so that its balance of interests remains calibrated on the side of
fairness.
The legislative history of the ADA and the Supreme Court opinions that
give it life impose three requirements on direct threat determinations. First,
the determination must be based on an individualized inquiry.30 3 Second, risk
297 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 338 ("[D]etermination that an individual with a disability will
pose a safety threat to others must be made on a case-by-case basis .... ).
298 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); see also infra Part IV.B.1
(discussing the requirement of an individualized inquiry).
299 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45 (stating that direct threat determina-
tions not be predicated on "stereotypes or fear.., speculation about the risk or
harm to others... [or] generalizations about the disability").
30 See supra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
301 See, e.g., Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275 (1 1th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2293 (2002) (finding that a remote risk of
transmitting HIV to dental patients was a significant risk under the direct threat
provision of the ADA); Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th
Cir. 1995) (finding that a remote and theoretical risk of transmitting HIV to the
patients of a medical assistant was a significant risk under the direct threat
provision of the ADA).
302 See Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701 (9th
Cir. 1988) (requiring, at a minimum, proof of a documented case of transmission
in order for risk of transmission to be significant).
303 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 58.
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must be evaluated by objective medical evidence."° Third, and most
importantly, the risk must, in fact, be significant. °5
1. The Requirement of an Individualized Inquiry
When Congress codified the direct threat provision from the Supreme
Court's opinion in School Board ofNassau County v. Arline,0 6 it made clear
that the Court's interpretation was integrated into the provision.3 7 In Arline,
the Court discussed at length the need for individualized determinations,
especially with regard to contagious diseases:
The fact that some persons who have contagious diseases may pose a serious
health threat to others under certain circumstances does notjustify excluding
from the coverage of the Act all persons with actual or perceived contagious
diseases. Such exclusion would mean that those accused of being contagious
would never have the opportunity to have their condition evaluated in light
of medical evidence and a determination made as to whether they were
'otherwise qualified.' Rather, they would be vulnerable to discrimination on
the basis of mythology--precisely the type of injury Congress sought to
prevent.
30 8
In addition to expressly adopting the Arline framework for examining direct
threat, the legislative history of the ADA evinces an intent for direct threat
determinations to be based on individualized inquiries.3' The ADA requires
304 See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987)
(quoting Brief of the Am. Med. Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 19).
305 See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 29 C.F.R. § 1630
(1991).306 Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n. 16.
307 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 76, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
359 (citingArline, 480 U.S. at287 n.16); see also id. pt. 3, at 45, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,468 ("In order to determine whether an individual poses a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace, the Committee
intends to use the same standard as articulated by the Supreme Court in School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline.... This definition was added to clarify that the
direct threat standard is a codification of the analysis in Arline.").
30 Arline, 480 U.S. at 285.
309 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 58; see also Hubbard, supra note
13, at 1307 ("ADA legislative reports repeatedly insist on fact-specific, case-by-
case determinations, denouncing group-based assessments and reliance on
generalizations about persons with a particular disability. They conclude that
employment decisions based on averages and group-based predictions are
incompatible with the Act's requirement of individualized assessments.").
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employers to "make employment decisions based on facts applicable to
individual applicants or employees, and not on the basis of presumptions as
to what a class of individuals with disabilities can or cannot do."31 Further-
more, Congress viewed risk evaluation as commanding a "fact-specific
individualized inquiry."311 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") has also promulgated regulations requiring direct threat determina-
tions to be "based on individualized factual data.., rather than on stereotypic
or patronizing assumptions .. "312
Failure to base direct threat conclusions on individualized inquiry results
in logical inconsistencies. 3 Since conclusions as to whether a person is
disabled must be based on individualized inquiry,314 conclusions as to the risk
presented by that disability must also be based on individualized inquiry.
315
"To conclude otherwise would be to say to ADA plaintiffs: 'We will
scrutinize you to determine whether you are entitled to coverage of the Act,
but if you are, we will then generalize about you and your disability to justify
the employer's decision to exclude you.' ,,316
Despite this prescription by the Supreme Court and its adoption by
Congress,3 17 courts have refused to give individualized treatment in HIV
cases.318 The Ninth Circuit essentially requires a documented case of
transmission.319 Such a requirement is outside the bounds of Congressional
intent because it requires the lower courts to classify the rights of employers,
not on actual risk, but based manifestation of risk consequences. Opposite
the Ninth Circuit are the Fourth, 320 Fifth,32' Sixth,312 and Eleventh Cir-
310 H.R. REP. No. 101-458, pt. 2, at 58.
3, Id. at 57.
312 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1991).
313 See Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1308.
314 See supra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
315 See Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1308.
316 Id.
317 H.R. REP. No. 100-485, pt. 2, at 58, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
340; Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 280-86 (1987).
311 See Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701
(1988) (requiring, minimally, proof of a documented case of transmission in order
for risk of transmission to be significant).
319 Id.
320 See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1265 (4th Cir.
1995).
321 See, e.g., Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922,
924 (5th Cir. 1993).
322 See, e.g., Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 403-05 (6th
Cir. 1998).
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cuits,323 which equate theoretical and remote risks with significant risks.324
Again, this approach classifies the rights of individuals with disabilities with
regard to public and judicial perception of risk rather than actual risk.
2. The Requirement of Objective Medical Evidence
The Supreme Court, again in Arline,325 mandated that direct threat
determinations be based on "reasonable medical judgments., 326 In addition,
the Court held that, "[i]n making these findings, courts normally should defer
to the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials."3 27 The
Supreme Court reaffirmed its stance on the requirement of objective medical
evidence in Bragdon.328 In that case, the Court noted that "the views of public
health authorities ... are of special weight and authority. ' 329 However, the
Supreme Court also held that such conclusions could be refuted.33° Some
courts have interpreted the holding to require adherence to the opinions of
public health authorities unless their conclusions are "medically unsup-
portable."
331
323 See, e.g., Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1298 (1 lth Cir. 1999).
324 See Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275 (1 1th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2293 (2002) (finding that a remote risk of trans-
mitting HIV to dental patients was considered a significant risk under the direct
threat provision of the ADA); Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d at 1261 (a remote and
theoretical risk of transmitting HIV to the patients of a medical assistant was
considered a significant risk under the direct threat provision of the ADA);
Bradley, 3 F.3d at 922 (holding that the risk of death, no matter how remote,
created a significant risk to others in the workplace of the HIV-petitioner surgeon);
Mauro, 137 F.3d at 398 (finding that the severity of the risk, although remote,
rendered a surgical technician a direct threat to his patients).
325 Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
326 Id. at 288 (quoting Brief of the Am. Med. Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 19).
327 Id.
328 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
329 Id. at 650 (Public health authorities include the U.S. Public Health Service,
the Center for Disease Control, and the National Institutes of Health.).
330 Id. at 650-51.
331Bagenstos, supra note 160, at 1491 n.48 (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d
934, 935 (1 st Cir. 1997), vacated by 524 U.S. 624 (1998)); see also id. at 1491 ("If
public health officials say it is safe to hire or serve a particular individual with a
disability, the Court has said, that individual generally may not be excluded unless
the defendant shows that the judgments of those officials are 'medically unsup-
portable.' ").
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The EEOC has issued regulations governing the use of evidence in risk
determinations.332 These regulations require medical evidence to be both
objective and current.333 One of the most regarded publications on disease
information, the Journal of the American Medical Association, has deter-
mined that there is no known risk of IV transmission in places such as
schools, offices, and factories.334 In addition, the CDC has determined that
"the kind of non-sexual person-to-person contact that generally occurs among
workers and clients or consumers in the workplace does not pose a risk of
transmission of HIV."
335
Given the authority requiring deference to public health officials and the
special expertise of bodies like the CDC,336 the lack of deference to such
officials is curious. There are a number of reasons cited for the mistrust of the
scientific community and related agencies. 37 The primary reason cited is
scientific pluralism. 338 Scientific pluralism, or divergent conclusions on
similar sets of facts, implies two flaws with reliance on medical authori-
ties--inaccuracy and imposition of individual values in the scientific
process.
331
Additionally, critics argue that quantifying whether a risk is significant
cannot be achieved through wholly objective means because it is not
exclusively a factual question.34 Essentially, when determining whether a risk
is significant, the scientist or authoritative body does two things.34" First, it
332 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2001).
333 Id. (requiring that the direct threat "assessment shall be based on a reason-
able medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on
the best available objective evidence").
334 See JAMA, HIV/AIDS Resource Center: Education & Support Center, at
http://www.ama-assn.org/special/hiv/support/risk/risk.htm (last visited Apr. 13,
2002).
331 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Update: UniversalPrecautions
for Prevention of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis B
Virus, and Other Bloodborne Pathogens in Health-Care Settings, 37 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 379 (June 24, 1988)).
336 See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (1995).
331 See generally Sullivan, supra note 14, at 601-04 (discussing the difficulty
of defining significance of the risk).338 See id. at 645-47 (citing Sheila Jasanoff, American Exceptionalism and the
Political Acknowledgment of Risk, 119 DAEDULUS 61, 75 (1990) ("Because of
scientific pluralism, the prescription to 'consult the experts and do what they say'
has relatively little meaning in the context of American risk politics.")).
339 Id. at 647-51.
340 Id.
341 See generally id.
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quantifies the risk in terms of probability.342 Second, it determines whether
that level or probability of risk is acceptable.343 Thus, the "objective evalua-
tor" is imparting individual or public values into the concept of risk.3"
The Supreme Court alluded to the objectivity problem in Bragdon.345 The
Court held that Abbott's citation of the American Dental Association's
statements affirming that it was safe to treat HIV-positive patients, was
evidence of the risk but not conclusive of it.346 Classifying the American
Dental Association as a professional organization, the Court held that the
Association's judgments were subject to being laden with ethical and
professional responsibilities toward patients.347 Thus, its recommendations
were neither objective nor based on wholly factual assessments. 4
The Court did not view the American Dental Association as a public
health authority because of its character as a professional organization.349 The
Court, however, regarded the CDC as a public health authority.35 ° In addition
to the Supreme Court and EEOC mandating deference to such authorities,
commentators suggest political reasons supporting deference to agencies such
as the CDC."' Such agencies relate favorably to disabled individuals and the
community in three ways.352 First, the CDC does not reflect the bias of
society.353 Second, the CDC exercises restraint in relation to public fears and
tends to be responsive to disadvantaged populations.354 Third, the CDC bases
its conclusions on public health and not the individual.355 Samuel Bagenstos
offers an example of how these three factors affect conclusions about risk:
Allowing doctors to refuse treatment to people with HIV (for example)
might eliminate a (tiny) risk to the individual doctors, but only at the expense
of creating greater risks to society as a whole (by, for example, depriving
3 4 2
1d.
143 See generally id. at 653-67.
344 id.
141 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 651-52 (1998).
346Id. at 652.
347ld.
348 Id.
3491d.
35o Id. at 650.
351 See Bagenstos, supra note 160, at 1498-1503. For simplicity, the CDC is
used in this section in place of public health authorities generally.
352 Id.
353 Id. at 1498-99.
354 Id. at 1499-500.
"I Id. at 1499.
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people with HIV of the care they need for opportunistic infections that may
themselves be contagious, or by eliminating other opportunities to provide
people with HIV the means to mitigate the risks they might pose to
others).
356
Thus, public health authorities often base conclusions about risk on the
overall ramifications of certain practices, considering collective risk rather
than individual risk. Reliance on public health authorities that examine
collective risk aids in giving meaning to the significance of the risk inquiry.
Since agencies like the CDC have considered broader social ramifications, the
facts provided by the CDC (and used by the court) already contain validly
examined, scientific concerns about public risk. Reliance on public health
authorities eliminates much of the court's expressed need to impart value
judgments into the significance of the risk inquiry.
3. The Measure of Significance
In passing the direct threat provision of the ADA, Congress chose to
codify the Arline framework.357 Choosing this interpretation, Congress
decided that, to remove the protections of the ADA, a risk must be
significant.35 In adoptingArline's four-part-test, Congress mandated that the
significance of the risk be based, at least in part, on the probability that the
disease will be transmitted to another.359 A remote risk is a risk that, by
definition,3" is unlikely to occur. Despite this fundamental requirement,
courts continue to equate remote but severe risks with highly probable,
significant risks.361 Furthermore, the legislative history focuses on the
3561d. at 1500.
311 See H.R. REI'. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 76 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 359; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 468 ("In order to determine whether an individual poses
a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace, the
Committee intends to use the same standard as articulated by the Supreme Court
in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.... This definition was added to
clarify that the direct threat standard is a codification of the analysis in Arline.").
358 Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987).
319 See id. at 288.
360 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1459 (4th ed. 1968).
361 See, e.g., Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275 (1 1th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2293 (2002).
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necessity of actual probability.362 Committee reports of the House and Senate
require the risk to be significant, not "speculative or remote. 363
As is demonstrated by case law,36 courts have refused to adhere to the
requirements of individualized inquiry, the use of objective medical evidence
and deference to public health authorities, and the true meaning of "signifi-
cance" of the risk. Unfortunately, courts have seized the opportunity to impart
their own value judgments into the direct threat debate by skewing the
meaning of significance. The following section assesses the Supreme Court's
inclination to follow suit.
C. The Likely Direction of the Supreme Court
The multiple opinions in Bragdon v. Abbott,365 are instructive in
examining the likely direction of the Supreme Court. Particularly useful are
the conflicting opinions of Justices Stevens and Rehnquist. 36 Each is
discussed below.
Justice Stevens joined in the majority opinion of the Court in Bragdon,
particularly in the rationale supporting HIV as a qualifying disability.367
However, he wrote separately, joined by Justice Breyer, to express a
preference for "outright affirmance" in favor of the plaintiff.368 Justice
Stevens argued that no triable issue existed on the question of direct threat,
and that Bragdon had not provided any evidence that would allow a jury to
conclude that treating Abbott in his dental office posed a direct threat to his
health or safety.369 Moreover, Stevens and Breyer opined:
There are not, however, five justices who agree that the judgment
should be affimned. Nor does it appear that there are five Justices who favor
a remand for proceedings consistent with the views expressed in either
JUSTICE KENNEDY'S opinion for the Court or the opinion of THE
CHIEF JUSTICE. Because I am in agreement with the legal analysis in
JUSTICE KENNEDY'S opinion, in order to provide a judgment supported
362 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 56.
363 id.
36 See supra pp. 879-90.
365 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
366 Id. at 655-56 (Stevens, J., concurring), 657-64 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting
in part). Note that Justice Ginsburg's opinion concurred in all respects and further
stated that the Court should "err[ ] ... on the side of caution." Id. at 656.
367 Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring).
368 Id. at 656.
369 Id. at 655.
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by the majority, I join that opinion even though I would prefer an outright
affurmance.
370
Conversely, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and O'Connor, disagreed with all points of the majority regarding whether
HIV was a disability,371 but agreed with the majority in its remand on the
direct threat question, with much favor going to the defendant Bragdon.3'2
The Chief Justice strongly agreed with the majority that Bragdon raised a
triable issue of fact on the issue of direct threat.373 More significant is the
following statement in the dissent:
Given the "severity of the risk" involved here, i.e., near certain death, and
the fact that no public health authority had outlined a protocol for eliminat-
ing this risk in the context of routine dental treatment, it seems likely that
[Bragdon] can establish that it was objectively reasonable for him to
conclude that treating [Abbott] in his office posed a "direct threat" to his
safety.
374
The dissent's statement mirrors the analysis of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits;375 that any risk, when the consequences are death, is a
significant risk and a direct threat to the health and safety of others.376 Also
like the named circuits, this determination is made without regard to the
remoteness of the risk.
Thus, four Justices would interpret the significance of the risk determina-
tion (within the direct threat standard) very broadly, resulting in exclusion of
many HFIV-positive employees from the protections of the ADA.377 Two
Justices would interpret significance of the risk narrowly, resulting in greater
protections for HIV-positive individuals. 37 The likely direction of the
remaining Justices is unclear, although Ginsburg would "err[ ] ... on the side
of caution," presumably in favor of employers.379 Given Ginsburg's conser-
170 Id. at 656 (citations omitted).
371 Id. at 657-61 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part).
372 Id. at 661-66.
373 id.
374 Id. at 664.
375 See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
376 See supra note 165.
177 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 657-64 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part).
378 Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring).
379 Id. at 656 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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vative approach,3"' future opinions may favor employers at the expense ofthe
disabled and the promise of the ADA.
V. PROPOSAL
The likely direction of the Supreme Court38"' warrants an examination of
the direct threat standard by Congress. Moreover, it necessitates a definition
from Congress regarding the meaning of "significance of the risk" and
guidance in how to apply the direct threat standard.382 To give effect to the
purpose of the ADA in eliminating discrimination against the disabled,3 3
particularly discrimination based on the unwarranted fear of HIV and
AIDS,3 4 the authors propose the following standard for determining whether
an individual with a disability poses a direct threat to the health and safety of
others:
An individual poses a significant risk and a direct threat to the health and
safety of others in the workplace if, after reasonable accommodations are
made, there is a reasonable probability that an event will occur, causing the
risk to materialize and result in significant physical harm to others in the
workplace.
This proposed definition of "direct threat" and "significant risk" gives
effect to the purposes of the ADA and to Congressional intent in two ways.
First, the proposed standard focuses on elements external to the individual
with a disability, reducing the likelihood of allowing stereotypes to influence
risk assessment.38 5 Second, the proposed standard is flexible enough to allow
for an individualized inquiry,386 but strict enough to prevent unwarranted fears
about IlV and other disabilities to influence risk assessment.387
A. Focusing on the Circumstances, Not the Disability
The proposed standard requires that the court examine the activities and
environment of the disabled individual to determine the probability of an
380 Id. at 656-57.
381 See supra notes 365-80 and accompanying text.
382 See supra note 160.
383 See supra note 266.
384 See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987); see also
generally Sullivan, supra note 14 (discussing the effect of stereotypes on
perceptions of risk).
385 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 56.
386 See supra Part IV.B. 1.
387 See supra note 266.
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event bringing about the risk. In doing so the standard removes the focus on
the disability. In the case of the HIV-positive individual, the standard requires
that it be reasonably probable that others in the workplace would be exposed
to the blood of the individual. Essentially, the proposed standard prevents bias
about the disability because the disability requires little examination. The
directthreat determination hinges on an event, not on perceptions about a
disability.
B. The Benefits of an Individualized Inquiry and a Near-Bright-Line Rule
The proposed standard requires that the circumstances of the individual
be examined on a case-by-case basis, looking at (1) elements of the environ-
ment that are likely to bring about the risk; (2) the probability that the risk
could occur without a triggering event; and (3) characteristics of the
individual that are likely to cause the risk to materialize. Thus, it treats all
disabled persons as presenting a unique set of circumstances on which to base
their rights.388 However, the proposed standard approximates a bright-line rule
in that it limits judicial discretion (and bias), and it mandates a particular
result at a particular point on the line of probability.
In considering how the existing standard could be changed to eliminate
the effect of judicial stereotypes about disabilities, the authors considered
requiring that the event bringing about the risk be more probable than not to
occur. However, such a standard would be unworkable since it would require
that a surgeon be cut fifty-one percent of the time when performing surgery,
or that a kickboxing instructor receive a blood-producing wound during fifty-
one percent of matches or practices. Given that the result of the risk is death,
fifty-one percent seems too high on the line of probability.
The proposed standard, that there be a reasonable probability that the
event will occur, is less of a bright-line rule. Thus, it allows for more
discretion than the rejected standard. Although the proposed standard allows
for greater judicial discretion and bias, it also requires that there be an actual
probability.389 The use of the term "reasonable" is not to be related to the
degree of harm that would result but to the actual probability that the event
will occur. There may be less than a fifty-one percent chance that the event
will occur, but there also must be greater than a remote or negligible chance
that the event will occur.
388 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 56 (requiring an individualized deter-
mination).
389 This standard complies with the legislative history of the ADA, requiring a
significant, "not a speculative or remote risk." H.R. REP. No. 10 1-485, pt. 2, at 56
(1990).
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C. The Kickboxer, the Judge, and the Cases of the Teacher and Hygienist
An application of the proposed standard illustrates the benefits of
removing the focus from the disability and use of a near-bright-line rule. In
each of the following cases: the kickboxer,39°judge, 9' teacher,3 92 and surgeon,
the inquiry is the same. What is the probability that others will be exposed to
the blood of the individual?
The HIV-positive kickboxing instructor is probably a direct threat to the
health and safety of others. Physical combat is likely to bring about blood-
producing wounds. Since a kickboxer probably does not receive such a wound
fifty-one percent of the time, it is possible that the direct threat provision will
not apply. However, since the object of the sport is to bring about such
wounds, there is a greater than remote chance of doing so. Because the
chances of a blood-producing wound occurring are less than fifty-one percent
but greater than remote, the court has discretion as to whether there is a direct
threat. Given the object of the sport, the court would likely find a direct threat
even in the absence of bias.
The HIV-positive judge is not a direct threat to the health and safety of
others. Assuming that the most probable blood-producing event is a fall or a
physical attack, the probability that such an event will occur is less than fifty-
one percent. Certainly,judges do not have nasty falls or get violently attacked
at work 2.5 times per week. Additionally, the risk of such an event is
negligible. The judge is protected from attack by her bailiff. Falls must be
considered negligible or every HIV-positive individual would have to be
quarantined. Since the risk that a blood-producing event will occur is
negligible, the judge is not a direct threat to the health and safety of others.
Under the proposed standard, the court has no discretion to hold otherwise.
Vincent Chalk, the teacher, is not a direct threat to the health and safety
of his students or co-workers.393 The possibility of a bite was not a major
factor in Chalk."' The court also found that HIV could not be transmitted
through a bite.395 Even if there were a high probability of Chalk being bitten,
no harm would result. Thus, the standard would not apply. Assuming that a
court, in its discretion, determined that HIV could be transmitted by bite, the
focus would turn to the probability that Chalk would, in fact, be bitten.
390 See supra note 2.
391 See supra p. 860.
392 See supra note 5.
393 See Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701 (9th
Cir. 1988).394 Id. at 708.
395 Id.
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It is unclear whether Spencer Waddell,396 the hygienist, is a direct threat
to the health and safety of his dental patients. The Eleventh Circuit deter-
mined that since a sharp instrument is "rarely" in the patient's mouth at the
same time as the dentist's fingers, they are simultaneously in the patient's
mouth only "sometimes." '397 Since "there is some risk, even if theoretical and
small, that blood-to-blood contact between hygienist and patient can occur,"
the court determined that Waddell was a direct threat to the health and safety
of his patients.39" The proposed standard would require a remand of the case
because the court did not examine the actual probability that the risk would
occur.399 Based on the Court's finding that the risk is theoretical and small, the
risk would be negligible, and not a direct threat.40 In reality, the court
refrained from the probability examination because it held any risk of HIV
transmission to qualify as significant.4 1' Although the result might be that the
proposed standard would not allow the court to base its ruling on a subjective
fear of HV, the determination would be based on strict probability without
reference to the disease.
In each of the cases above, the inquiry was limited to the environment and
activity of the individual, not on the disease. By focusing on the individual
and her environment, rather than on her disease, the standard forces the court
to use a more objective approach. The proposed standard removes irrational
fears and myths from the legal equation.
When the Supreme Court outlined the direct threat standard in Arline, it
expressed that the individual should pose a significant risk to others.402
Congress codified those words.403 Some members considered that there
needed to be a high probability of substantial harm.4' The proposed standard
gives effect to the intent of the Arline Court and Congress by requiring that
the risk be significant.405 The standard forces the court to look beyond the
disability of the individual, to think outside his or her "own culturally
396 See Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275 (11 th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2293 (2002).
397 Id. at 1282-83.
398 Id. at 1284.
399 Id.
400 Id.
401 Id.
402 See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 n.16 (1987).
403 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2000).
404 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303.
401 See Arline, 480 U.S. at 288 n.16.
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fabricated lens,"4 6 and reach a result that is fair to all individuals. Justice
requires that Congress replace the cultural lens of the judiciary with one that
is clear: one that is based on science and probability rather than fear and
mythology.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress, in passing the Americans with Disabilities Act, intended to
eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities;4. 7 it required
that they be judged in their true capacity,4" 8 not by a perception sewn on them
by society.40 9 Although the direct threat provision of the ADA was intended
to strike a balance between the interests of disabled workers and their
employers, many courts have used the provision in contravention of those
aims. Imparting their own fears and biases about lHIV and AIDS into direct
threat determinations, courts have stripped many individuals of protections
granted by the ADA.410 The proposed standard guards against the threat of
public and judicial bias by providing a more objective, quantifiable standard.
The proposed standard mandates that courts evaluate probability and apply
it meaningfully. The opinions of the Supreme Court Justices in Bragdon
suggest that the Court is likely to rule in the same value-laden manner as the
court in Waddell, 1 holding that any risk of HIV transmission is a direct
threat. Congress should implement the proposed standard so that all courts
must render judgments based on facts, not on fears.
Beneath the conundrum of Congress and the direct threat provision is the
fact that IIV-positive individuals are living, breathing, and feeling members
406 DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 1, at 194.
407 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(4) (2000).
408 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 40 (stating that people with disabilities
"have been subjected to unequal and discriminatory treatment in a range of areas,
based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and
resulting from stereotypical assumptions, fears and myths not truly indicative of the
ability of such individuals to participate in and contribute to society.").
409 See supra pp. 892-94.
410 See Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275 (1 th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2293 (2002) (finding that a remote risk of
transmitting HIV to dental patients was a significant risk under the direct threat
provision of the ADA); Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th
Cir. 1995) (finding that a remote and theoretical risk of transmitting HIV to the
patients of a medical assistant was a significant risk under the direct threat
provision of the ADA).
411 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Waddell, 275 F.3d at 1275.
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of the community. As employers and co-workers, there is a moral duty to
want for others what we want for ourselves. Driving a car poses a risk of
death to others. Yet, we consider the risk negligible for two reasons. First,
millions of people drive to work, school, and for pleasure each day without
manifestation of the consequences of the risk. Thus, we determine the risk of
death to be low on the line of probability. Second, driving allows us all to be
productive participants in society, leading to happiness and pride. When the
risk of HIV transmission is low on the line of probability, HJV-positive
individuals deserve to experience the same pride in working and participating
in society. Adoption of the proposed standard would provide legal justice to
fill the gaps left by private discrimination.

